Next Generation 911 (NG911)

For years, NG911 progress was slowed by originating service provider (OSP) delays in migrating to Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)-based call delivery. The FCC’s 2024 demarcation order establishes enforceable requirements and timelines for OSPs once a state 911 authority issues a formal migration request.  

• This ruling gives states a mechanism to compel OSP compliance, removing a longstanding barrier to achieving full i3 interoperability.
• Historically, OSPs cited cost, complexity, and competing priorities as reasons for postponement; the new ruling shifts responsibility and accelerates nationwide migration.

Governance maturity is the most reliable indicator of NG911 success. Early-adopter states share one common trait: a centralized 911 authority capable of setting policy, aligning funding, ensuring vendor accountability, and coordinating operations. States with decentralized or advisory-only governance consistently lag.

• Robust governance also is foundational for securing sustainable funding. Without a unified state authority, it is exceedingly difficult to modernize funding statutes, advocate for surcharge increases, coordinate lobbying efforts, or educate legislators.
• Governance is the prerequisite for cohesive policy and financial structures that support long-term NG911 functionality.

Many states launched initial NG911 components using one-time federal dollars — for example, ARPA¹ funds — without committing to ongoing operational revenues. This created the appearance of NG911 deployment without addressing its long-term sustainment. As temporary funds expire, states face substantial operational and cybersecurity costs that legacy surcharge models cannot support.

• Most surcharges were designed during the analog 911 era, when equipment was cheaper, networks less complex, and cybersecurity requirements minimal. Today’s digital environment demands updated fee structures.
• States must reassess surcharge levels, expand eligible expenditure categories (e.g., GIS, cybersecurity, cloud services), and remove statutory caps. This is the most direct path toward achieving durable, equitable NG911 systems.
  

¹American Rescue Plan Act. 

GIS maturity lags other NG911 components across the country, despite its foundational role in i3 routing. Because i3 routing replaces² MSAG/ESN entirely with geospatial routing, the accuracy of call delivery depends on the precision of GIS datasets. Inadequate GIS compromises speed, accuracy, and reliability.

• Local jurisdictions — particularly small or rural ones — often lack experienced GIS staff, adequate funding, and knowledge of NG911-specific requirements such as synchronization with NGCS providers, addressing authority standards, and data maintenance cycles.
• Strengthening statewide GIS governance, data-sharing frameworks, and technical support programs offers one of the greatest opportunities to improve NG911 readiness.

² Master Street Address Guide/Emergency Service Number.

Despite nationwide progress, many states remain far from full i3 adoption. Approximately one-third of states lack statewide Emergency Services IP Network (ESInet) or fragmented NGCS³ deployments, continue to rely on legacy selective routers, and operate with limited redundancy and resiliency. 

• Some call-handling equipment vendors advertise i3 capabilities but lack full interoperability, contributing to inconsistent performance and increased integration complexity.
• These disparities impede the ability to realize NG911 benefits such as faster, more accurate emergency call routing and improved situational awareness.

³ Next-generation core services.

Cybersecurity remains one of the most significant threats to NG911 readiness. Even as awareness grows, vulnerabilities persist due to fragmented IT environments, insufficient funding, and overreliance on vendors. The shift to fully IP-based systems means cybersecurity weaknesses can quickly become operational failures. 

• Local agencies are especially vulnerable. Most do not conduct regular penetration tests, independent vulnerability assessments, continuous monitoring via a security operations center (SOC), or routine cybersecurity incident exercises.
• In an interconnected NG911 ecosystem, a breach in one ECC can create cascading failures across regions.

NG911 is not just a technical upgrade; it represents a fundamental shift in workflow and operations. States with mature NG911 deployments have adapted training, procedures, and operations accordingly. Laggard states show uneven readiness, inconsistent training programs, and limited understanding of new workflows such as multimedia handling, real-time text, and data-driven interoperability.

• Continuity-of-operations (COOP) and disaster-recovery (DR) planning remain weak nationwide.
• Many jurisdictions lack formal plans, rely on outdated documents, or have not adapted to the IP-based NG911 environment.
• NG911’s interconnected nature increases the risk of cascading operational disruptions when COOP/DR plans fail.

As NG911 technology becomes more advanced and expensive and 911 revenue declines, many ECCs cannot realistically maintain the required levels of cybersecurity, GIS data accuracy, staffing, redundancy, and technical capability on their own.

• NG911 infrastructure, managed services, cybersecurity, and cloud solutions cost significantly more than legacy systems.
• 911 authorities will need to explore alternative funding mechanisms, such as including it in sales or property taxes.
• Small dispatch centers lack the resources to meet NG911 performance expectations —capabilities that consolidation/regionalization can provide more efficiently, especially in rural areas.